The judgments in the Gauss case were set aside on appeal, despite the fact that each of the transactions was signed by CCR, GAF`s sole and exclusive representative empowered to settle asbestos claims on behalf of GAF. The Tribunal found that the comparisons referred to in Section 664.6 were not applicable for the two reasons invoked by GAF: it did not sign the settlement agreements and the agreements did not contain any indication of GAF`s share in each transaction. In addition, it is essential that the settlement agreement and the disposition or oral application submitted to the Tribunal show that the parties agree that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to render judgment on the basis of the terms of the settlement agreement and not only remains competent to enforce those conditions; Only then can the parties be confident that they can use the practice of the application under CCP 664.6 to enforce the terms of their transaction. While this factual scenario seems tailor-made for summary execution under section 664.6, what would happen if you and your client tried to impose the registered procedure? Would it be important for the accused to be represented only by an agent who has assured the court of his absolute and exclusive decision-making power? Would it be important for the proceedings, in view of the total amount of the dollar to be paid to the claimant, not to establish the obligation of a single defendant to finance the settlement? What if the Jack Nicholson character of your case offered no more than a furious nod as consent to the terms of the transaction? Or if a party who is not present in court cannot accept the settlement at the time and there, but his lawyer promised that the written approval of the agreed terms would take place?. d a communication on the conditional settlement of the whole case. . . . .